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Abstract 
 
This interdisciplinary article draws on the social sciences to posit a tripartite model from 
which literary research into disability can benefit. Ableism and disablism are defined by 
normative positivisms and non-normative negativisms respectively, but consideration is also 
given to non-normative positivisms. Informed by experiential knowledge, the model is 
illustrated with reference to a trilogy of literary representations of blindness: George Sava’s 
novel Happiness is blind (1987), Brian Friel’s play Molly Sweeney (1994), and Stephen 
Kuusisto’s memoir Eavesdropping (2006). The result is a complex reading that recognises 
problems but also non-normative renderings of happiness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Points of interest  
 
• Based on experience and theory, this article introduces the tripartite model of 
disability. 
• The model recognises the affirmation of socially accepted standards, alongside 
problematised and affirmed deviations from those standards. 
• This model is applied to literary representations of blindness from the past few 
decades that are found to challenge commonplace assumptions about disability and 
suffering. 
• Not only characterisation and narrative but also staging, critical readings, and 
authorial factors are considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: Disability and happiness 
 
Whether the ‘primary focus for justice’ should be ‘the distribution of happiness, wealth, or 
something else’ (Vehmas and Watson, 2014: 643) is an intriguing question because disability 
and unhappiness constitute a likely combination according to many modes of representation. 
The absence of discourses about happiness and disability is entrenched both culturally and 
historically (Sunderland et al., 2009). The ableist assumption is that people seeking to access 
the so-called full benefits of citizenship must have minimum levels of corporeal, intellectual, 
and sensory capacity, not to mention accordance with various subjective and cultural 
aesthetic conditions (Snyder and Mitchell, 2010; Mitchell and Snyder, 2015). In these terms, 
those of us who identify as disabled become wanting and deviant. In relation to happiness, 
the presence of impairment is regarded and represented as an impediment for first and third 
parties alike (Kirk, 2009), while the unimpaired body masquerades as the precondition for its 
pursuit (Jordan, 2013). Consequently, according to many modes of representation, disability 
tends to be associated with negativity rather than positivity. 
 
One source of this unhappiness is in the problematics of the research that can come to 
underpin cultural representations. For instance, some work suggests that those of us who 
identify as disabled misreport levels of happiness, while non-disabled people mispredict the 
emotional impact that disability would have on their lives (Ubel et al., 2005). This suggestion 
makes sense insofar as discourses about unhappiness and disability are culturally and 
historically entrenched, and as such are likely to have a negative impact on research 
participants, whether or not they identify as disabled. Moreover, researchers are similarly 
affected by these discourses and may add to the problem, as exemplified in a questionnaire 
about a trial for insulin: participants were asked if they looked forward to the future, if they 
threw things around when upset or angry, if they got touchy or moody about diabetes, if they 
hurt themselves or felt like hurting themselves when they got upset, if they wished they were 
dead, if they wished they had not been born, and so on (Swain and French, 2000). The 
assumptions of suffering in this kind of questionnaire chime with the majority of news reports 
on disability around the world and serve only to break or discourage links with happiness. 
Thus, those of us who identify as disabled may use terms that range from negative to positive 
when discussing ourselves and our experiences, yet this is not reflected in the official 
discourses of disability (Sunderland et al., 2009). In brief, the problem is that too much 
research about disability can be unnecessarily limited and misleading. 
 
In disability studies, representations of unhappiness can be critiqued in many ways. Most 
obviously, the British social model of disability (which I refer to as the social model here) 
can be invoked to argue that such unhappiness arises from a disablist society and not from 
one’s biological impairment. Accordingly, even though some highly medicalised studies have 
rather predictably found that restricted mobility and/or physical loss have psychological 
consequences, that some people report a variety of depressive symptoms following the onset 
of impairment, others report relatively favourable levels of happiness (Dunn et al., 2009). 
Given that the ‘disability movement, like other emancipatory movements, is based on a 
positive sense of a group difference’ (Vehmas and Watson, 2014: 648), we might choose to 
invoke more recent approaches that encompass individual, collective, and cultural 
positivisms, whereby it is emphasised that those of us who identify as disabled can lead full, 
satisfying, and even exemplary lives (Swain and French, 2000; Kuppers, 2009; Mitchell and 
Snyder, 2015). In accordance with the affirmative model, for example, positivity about both 
impairment and disability may be asserted. To affirm a positive identity around impairment is 
to repudiate the dominant value of normality, so this model offers more than a transformation 
of consciousness about disability, it facilitates an assertion of the value and validity of the 
lives of people who have impairments (Swain and French, 2000). Alternatively, if a 
rhizomatic model is invoked, far from being regarded and represented as an impediment to 
happiness for first and third parties (i.e., disabled people and nondisabled friends, family, 
colleagues, etc.), disability becomes a site of richness and artful living (Kuppers, 2009). 
These and other such approaches recognise that those of us who identify as disabled may find 
happiness by transcending the very norms to which we are meant to aspire. 
 
The models invoked in disability studies are predicated on embodied epistemology (i.e., 
experiential knowledge) and as such help to disrupt prejudice. There is no uniformly accepted 
term for discrimination against those of us who identify as disabled (Harpur, 2012), a form of 
prejudice sometimes referred to as the nameless apartheid (Goggin and Newell, 2003). 
Nevertheless, a couple of Anglophone terms have emerged in the form of ableism and 
disablism (sometimes spelled disableism). Ableism is more widely used around the world, 
while disablism is favoured in the United Kingdom (Ashby, 2010), which suggests that the 
two terms have emerged because of the distinction between person-first and social model 
language (Harpur, 2012). In essence, both terms denote the same thing (Harpur, 2012), 
discriminatory or abusive conduct toward people based on physical or cognitive abilities 
(Harpur, 2009). Here, however, I follow work that has sought to appreciate the respective 
merits of the terms (Campbell, 2008, 2009; Harpur, 2012; Bolt, 2014a; Goodley, 2014). From 
such a perspective, ableism and disablism render radically different understandings of 
disability: the former is associated with the idea of ableness, the perfect or perfectible body, 
and the latter relates to the production of disability, in accordance with a social 
constructionist understanding (Campbell, 2008). Put differently, ableism renders nondisabled 
people supreme and disablism is a combination of attitudes and actions against those of us 
who identify as disabled.  
 
My proposition is that literary research about disability might be enhanced by consideration 
of a tripartite model based on a conceptual distinction between ableism and disablism. Set out 
in the first section of this article, the idea is that ableism and disablism can be understood as 
normative positivisms and non-normative negativisms respectively, both of which should be 
explored, but that consideration should also be given to what have been elsewhere designated 
non-normative positivisms (Coole and Frost, 2011; Mitchell and Snyder, 2015). This 
tripartite model of disability draws on embodied epistemology and is illustrated in the second 
section of the article with reference to literary constructs of blindness that have medical 
connections. Other methodologies could be similarly enhanced, but in my example textual 
analysis is applied to a small selection of literary texts from the past three decades.  
 
 
The tripartite model of disability: normative positivisms, non-normative negativisms, 
and non-normative positivisms 
 
The first part of the model pertains to normative positivisms (i.e., the affirmation of socially 
accepted standards) that are marked by ableism. Ableism has been defined as a political term 
that calls attention to assumptions about normalcy (Davis, 1995); it can be traced back to 
handicapism, a term coined nearly four decades ago to denote not only assumptions but also 
practices that promoted the unequal treatment of people because of apparent or assumed 
physical, mental, and/or behavioural differences (Bogdan and Biklen, 1977; Ashby, 2010). 
The concept of ableism, however, has been societally entrenched, deeply and subliminally 
embedded in culture, and rampant throughout history; it has been widely used by various 
social groups to justify their elevated rights and status in relation to other groups (Campbell, 
2008; Wolbring, 2008). That is to say, however we term it, ableism is an age-old concept. 
 
There are many variants of ableism. Cognitive ableism, for instance, is a bias in favour of the 
interests of people who actually or potentially have certain cognitive abilities (Carlson, 
2001); lexism is an array of normative practices, assumptions, and attitudes about literacy 
(Collinson, 2014); sanism is the privileging of people who do not have so-called mental 
health problems (Prendergast, 2014); and ocularcentrism is the dominance of visual 
perception on which this article comes to focus (Jay, 1994). The list could continue, for there 
has been a proliferation of normative positivisms in modernity.  
 
A thing to remember is that when people endeavour to occupy the subject position of 
ableism, they buy into a myriad of normative assumptions but often do so without 
premeditation or intent: they do so by acquiescence. After all, ableism is a deeply rooted, far-
reaching ‘network of beliefs, processes, and practices’ that produces a ‘corporeal standard’, a 
particular type of mind and body, which is projected as the perfect human (Campbell, 2001: 
44). This network of notions about health, productivity, beauty, and the value of human life 
itself, represented and perpetuated by public and private media, renders abilities such as 
productivity and competitiveness far more important than, say, empathy, compassion, and 
kindness (Rauscher and McClintock, 1997; Wolbring, 2008). Indeed, so pervasive is this 
network that people are likely to pick up a highly detailed working knowledge of ableism by 
osmosis alone (i.e., through the gradual absorption of ideas that results from continual 
exposure). 
 
Irrespective of intent, the widespread endorsement of ableism has dire consequences for 
society. Many bodies and minds are constructed and positioned as Other, meaning that many 
people fall outside the dominant norms of bodily appearance and/or performance and thus 
face social and material exclusion (Ashby, 2010; Hodge and Runswick-Cole, 2013). From 
this perspective, impairments are necessarily negative: they must be improved, cured, or else 
eliminated altogether; they certainly cannot contribute to an affirmative subjectivity 
(Campbell, 2008). In effect, ableism becomes a combination of discrimination, power, and 
prejudice that is related to the cultural privileging of nondisabled people; it oppresses those of 
us who have so-called mental health problems, learning difficulties, physical impairments, 
sensory impairments, and so on (Rauscher and McClintock, 1997; Eisenhauer, 2007). The 
normative positivisms of ableism indirectly result in the exclusion, victimisation, and 
stigmatisation of those of us who identify as disabled. 
 
Despite its dramatic effects, ableism has been referred to as a nebulous concept that evades 
both identification and definition (Hodge and Runswick-Cole, 2013). What is more, the term 
has been deemed limited in content and scope on the basis that it should not allude 
exclusively to disability, but should be used as an umbrella term (Wolbring, 2008), a call for 
terminological specificity that is answered to some extent by the term disablism. After all, 
although ableism itself is often obscured, the value it places on certain abilities leads to 
disablism (Wolbring, 2008; Hodge and Runswick-Cole, 2013). It might be said, therefore, 
that the normative positivisms of ableism result in the non-normative negativisms of 
disablism. 
 
Accordingly, the second part of the model pertains to non-normative negativisms (i.e., 
problematised deviations from socially accepted standards) that are marked by disablism. The 
term disablism is derived from the social model of disability, whereby the everyday practices 
of society perpetuate oppressive structures on those of us who have biological impairments 
(Madriaga, 2007). Discriminatory, oppressive, and/or abusive behaviour arises from the 
belief that we are somehow inferior to non-disabled people (Miller et al., 2004). As so-called 
less able people we are discriminated against, and different abilities become defined as 
disabilities (Thomas, 2004; Wolbring, 2008). Disablism, then, involves not only the ‘social 
imposition of restrictions of activity’ but also the ‘socially engendered undermining’ of 
‘psycho-emotional well-being’ (Thomas, 2007: 73). It is arguably a more profound, targeted, 
and specific development of ableism.  
 
This specificity notwithstanding, disablism is not necessarily explicit. Adapted from aversive 
racism theory, the term aversive disablism has been coined to denote subtle forms of 
prejudice (Deal, 2007). Like aversive racism, aversive disablism is often unintentional, so 
aversive disablists may recognise the problems of disablism without recognising their own 
prejudice (Deal, 2007). Given such subtleties, it is part of my proposition that ableism and 
disablism might be critically conceptualised on a continuum that moves from normative 
positivisms to non-normative negativisms. 
 
This ideological continuum can be illustrated with reference to, among other things, social 
and cultural constructs of visual perception. Ocularcentrism, as already noted, is the 
dominance of visual perception that is a fact of life for most people in most societies and as 
such becomes manifest in countless normative positivisms. A consequence of this variant of 
ableism is that those of us who do not perceive by visual means are necessarily Othered. 
Moreover, ocularcentrism predicates what has been elsewhere designated ocularnormativism 
(Bolt, 2014b), whereby the senses of touch, hearing, smell, and so on, are culturally and 
socially problematised. The normative positivisms become non-normative negativisms as 
non-visual means of perception are judged in visual terms and thus found wanting.  
 
In order to discourage simplistic readings if not renderings of disability, the third part of the 
proposed model pertains to non-normative positivisms (i.e., affirmed deviations from socially 
accepted standards) that depart from ableism and disablism. It is not enough to recognise 
disability along a continuum of difference that defines human variation; it is important to 
consider the ideology of neoliberal inclusiveness (Jordan, 2013). Ironically, thanks to 
neoliberalism, disability is in some ways more present than ever, a state of affairs that, in 
part, has resulted from tolerance that can be thought of as inclusionism (Mitchell and Snyder, 
2015). The meaning of inclusionism is that opportunities may well have opened to formerly 
excluded groups, which must be commended, but for inclusion to become truly worthwhile it 
must involve recognition of disability in terms of alternative lives and values that neither 
enforce nor reify normalcy. There is a need for non-normative positivisms because the fight 
for equality is both limited and limiting in its very scope, while empowering and progressive 
potential is offered by the profound appreciation of Peripheral Embodiments (Mitchell and 
Snyder, 2015). That is to say, inclusion may well be paramount but can become 
transformative and more comprehensively productive when disability is recognised as a site 
for alternative values.  
 
 
Reading blindness in contemporary literature: Novelistic, dramatic, and 
autobiographical representation  
 
While the tripartite model can be applied productively to any literary representation of 
disability, in this article I focus on George Sava’s Happiness is blind, Brian Friel’s Molly 
Sweeney, and Stephen Kuusisto’s Eavesdropping. Most obviously, these texts have been 
chosen for their detailed representations of visual impairment (the inclusion of life writing in 
the form of Kuusisto’s Eavesdropping proves particularly important in this respect). On a 
more general level, though, my rationale pertains to the social model of disability from which 
the tripartite model is ultimately derived. After all, the three texts are contemporaneous in 
their publication with the proliferation of work on the social model and yet relate to the 
contrasting approach of medicalisation in several ways (e.g., the medical profession is 
portrayed in both Happiness is blind and Molly Sweeney, not to mention biographical facts 
about Sava’s career as a surgeon and Kuusisto’s faculty appointment in a college of 
medicine). In addition, the 1987 novel, the 1994 play, and the 2006 memoir provide variety 
in terms of publication date and genre. 
 
Literary representations of blindness take many forms and one of the richest is the novel. 
Published in 1987, Happiness is blind is one of a number of works by George Sava that draws 
on medical insights gained from his successful career as a surgeon. In this novel, Anthony 
Street is a test pilot who sustains a facial injury that leaves him, as the blurb puts it, 
‘hideously disfigured’. Consequently, unable to find employment and shunned by his friends, 
he turns to a life of crime. He breaks into a flat but is interrupted by the owner, Helen Bourne, 
who, again as the novel’s blurb puts it, ‘lives alone despite the fact that she has been blind 
since birth’. This seemingly unfortunate meeting marks the beginning of a romantic 
relationship that results in the two characters getting married and having a child together. 
 
Before relating the tripartite model to this novel it should be acknowledged that, given the 
ubiquity of ableism and disablism, it is hardly surprising that positivity tends to be obscured 
in representations of disability. In Australia, for example, official professional and public 
discourses about disability and rehabilitation are predominantly negative, yet many 
potentially positive discursive and narrative factors are hidden beneath ableist if not disablist 
ways of knowing, being, acting, and describing in academic, policy, and practice settings 
(Sunderland et al., 2009). This being so, the first thing to note when analysing Happiness is 
Blind is that it contains massively problematic representations of disability. If social 
stereotypes become tropes in textual representation (Garland-Thomson, 1997), then Sava’s 
novel is underpinned by much in the way of stereotyping. Beauty and the beast, blindness-
darkness synonymy, and the fifth-sixth sense are just a few of the recurrent tropes that are 
utilised in the work (Bolt, 2014b). One illustration of such problematic representation is 
offered when Helen becomes a mother:  
 
 I want to see. I want to look on the sunshine. I want to see my child. All these years 
I've been happy and content in my darkness and now, when I've got something to be 
really happy about, I feel miserable for the first time. (Sava, 1987: 176) 
 
Illustrated here is the way in which normative positivisms lead to non-normative negativisms. 
Ocularcentrism renders motherhood a fundamentally visual experience and 
ocularnormativism dictates that vision is a necessary condition of its enjoyment, if not its 
very success. This example of problematic representation is one of several but, despite the 
again predictable medicalisation of disability, the novel also contains passages that can be 
interpreted far more positively. 
 
What the novel illustrates is that the continuum of normative positivisms and non-normative 
negativisms can be disrupted by the recognition of non-normative positivisms, meaning that 
the proposed tripartite model becomes tee-shaped in its conceptual form. More specifically, 
for the purpose of the example I use in this article, the often swift and imperceptible 
regression from ocularcentrism to ocularnormativism can be blocked. Accordingly, the reader 
of Happiness is Blind is informed that Helen is unique because rather than in spite of her 
blindness, that she has ‘found the secret of turning disability into a source of strength’ (Sava, 
1987: 163). Resonant with the constructive reframing of hearing loss as Deaf Gain (Bauman and 
Murray, 2009), as well as the subsequent reframing of disability loss as disability gain 
(Garland-Thomson, 2013), the transformation is illustrated when Helen persuades Tony to 
discuss and recognise virtues in his so-called ugliness: 
 
“You are easier to talk to than most people," she remarked, as they sipped their 
coffee. "Easier for me to talk to, perhaps, I should say. You see, so many people talk 
with their faces as well as their voices that I lose half their meaning. You have got to 
put all your meaning into your voice.” (Sava, 1987: 156)  
 
Here the idea is that, because of his facial injury, Tony’s mode of communication becomes 
focused on the verbal, an audible form that is particularly pertinent to Helen, given that she 
does not perceive the visual cues of body language. Moreover, with allusion to the rhizomatic 
model of disability, it might be said that there is comfort in the company of people whose 
impairments might be different, but whose experiences chime together (Kuppers, 2009). 
Thus, non-normative positivisms can be identified in the very meeting of these two disabled 
characters.  
 
It must be acknowledged, of course, that this identification of non-normative positivisms may 
raise concerns about compensatory powers, a notion widely problematised in relation to 
cultural representations of visual impairment (Monbeck, 1973; Kirtley, 1975; Kleege, 1999; 
Bolt, 2014b). Nevertheless, a close reading of Happiness is Blind can reveal a number of 
departures from ocularnormativism. For instance, music and poetry are said to bring Helen 
beauty, as does the touch of silk, fur, and so on. She goes on to explain that ‘normal people’ 
know little of such beauty but it is present for those who wish to appreciate it (Sava, 1987: 157). 
This comment on aesthetics, that the ‘resources of life are infinite to those who know how to 
draw on them’, diminishes connotations of compensatory powers. After all, the resources to 
which Helen refers must be engaged with actively, meaning that impairment is neither 
necessary nor sufficient as a condition of ability. The thing to stress is that normative 
compensatory powers involve, say, being able to see with one’s hands or ears, whereas non-
normative positivisms value the senses in and on their own terms. 
 
So although Happiness is Blind contains many problematic representations that may be 
categorised as normative positivisms and non-normative negativisms, it redeems itself on 
many counts. Helen goes through the ocularnormative phase of longing to see, but the 
eponymous state of happiness is ultimately found when the eye surgery is unsuccessful. She 
brings the novel to its conclusion by critiquing the sighted majority for looking on blindness 
as an affliction: ‘You do not know what it is to be blind, and you naturally think that without 
eyes our lives must be incomplete and denied most of the things you cherish. It is not true’ 
(Sava, 1987: 192). The salient point is that these moments of happiness are not rendered 
legitimate by ocularnormative representation. Helen owns the means of perception that are 
available to her; she does not find her own way of seeing. For this reason it can be argued that 
the novel departs from ableism and disablism, that it ventures beyond ocularnormativism and 
recognises the potential of non-normative positivisms. 
 
Comparably complex literary representations of blindness can be found in contemporary 
work in the age-old genre of drama. Published in 1994, Brian Friel’s Molly Sweeney depicts 
the medical profession in many ways. Accordingly, the play contains various attempts to 
‘orientate’ Molly in a ‘sighted world’: her father ‘teaches her about the colours of the flowers 
in her garden, while the other characters go to great lengths either to cure her, or to mask the 
most telling features of her blindness’ (Feeney, 2009: 90). Molly is a massage therapist who 
has been classed as blind since she was a baby. She leads a happy life that can be interpreted in 
terms of non-normative positivisms until, at her husband’s behest, her ophthalmologist 
performs an operation that has bittersweet consequences. Though restoring her sight after 
forty years of blindness, the medical intervention leaves her institutionalised and gravely ill. 
That is to say, the non-normative positivisms are destructively reframed as non-normative 
negativisms by the patriarchal element in the play and, for the title character, the consequence 
is critical. 
 
The play contains many non-normative negativisms, the most striking being the way in which 
Molly is objectified by her husband Frank and her ophthalmologist Mr Rice. Frank puts much 
time and effort into the compilation of what amounts to a medical, educational, sociological, 
and philosophical study of Molly’s life (Bolt, 2014b). Notably, it is not Molly’s name that 
takes pride of place on the work; the folder’s cover reads only ‘Researched and Compiled by 
Frank C. Sweeney’ (Friel, 1994: 6). This nominal displacement can be interpreted as a 
manifestation of Frank’s authority over Molly, the implication being that, as well as the 
folder, he has compiled her very life experience (Bolt, 2014b). A similarly self-serving 
approach is taken by Mr Rice, who endeavours to cure Molly in order to rescue his own 
career. These dynamics are indicative of Molly’s ‘downfall, as it is her desire to please the 
others that makes her agree to the operation, despite her own misgivings about losing her 
unique sightless world’ (DeVinney, 1999: 113). By Frank and Mr Rice alike, Molly is framed 
in non-normative negativisms as she becomes a project to distract them from their own 
inadequacies. 
 
Non-normative negativisms are rife in critical readings of the play, especially those that refer 
to metaphor. Many recent works of literary disability studies have explored the problematics 
of metaphor in detail (Vidali, 2010; Murray, 2012; Titchkosky, 2015). But the thing to stress 
for the purpose of the present article is that the process of metaphorisation is a substitutive 
one: whether we substitute entire objects for others or ‘use parts for the whole, the effect is to 
distract, to disengage from the initial object’ (Davis, 2012: x). For example, if we say ‘a 
woman is a rose’, for whatever reason, ‘we are looking away from the woman toward the 
rose’ (Davis, 2012: x). In the process of metaphorisation, then, the apparent focus is displaced 
and thus rendered superficial. Accordingly, in the discourse around Molly Sweeney it is often 
recognised that female representations of Ireland are ‘extremely problematic symbols in 
contemporary Irish literary and cultural studies, as are feminine national abstractions in 
postcolonial critique worldwide’ (Moloney, 2000: 286). The comparable metaphorisation of 
disability, though, is approached with less sensitivity and awareness. It has been asserted that 
the ‘blind Molly acts as a symbol for Gaelic Ireland, the partially sighted Molly serves as a 
metaphor for the colonized country, and Molly hospitalized for madness represents the 
postcolonial state’ (Moloney, 2000: 286). In these and other such readings, which fall on the 
continuum that moves from normative positivisms to non-normative negativisms, 
engagement with the representation of disability is actively avoided.  
 Even the staging of the play can prove problematic with the tripartite model in mind. Molly’s 
use of soliloquy is particularly significant in this respect. After all, the non-normative 
positivisms of her characterisation are demonstrable in the fact that she breaks the 
metaphorical ‘glass wall around the other soliloquists’, for the ‘other characters' refusal to do 
so then becomes part of their personalities’ (DeVinney, 1999: 113). However, these non-
normative positivisms are sometimes contradicted in the staging. All three characters remain 
onstage throughout the play, but in the 1994 premiere at the Gate Theatre in Dublin, Molly 
was ‘the only one to look at the others while they spoke’, even though the character could not 
‘physically see’ (DeVinney, 1999: 113). This aspect of the production is said to stage ‘the 
fact that she is the only character capable of emotional engagement with and understanding of 
the others’ (DeVinney, 1999: 113), a reading that illustrates the regression from 
ocularcentrism to ocularnormativism in its rendering of proper human communication. What 
is more, unlike the 1994 production at the Almeida in London, which featured a spotlight on 
each character’s chair that implied equality among the viewpoints expressed, the 2011 
production at the Gate Theatre in Dublin ‘featured a single, dangling light bulb above each 
character’s head that only came on when Molly spoke’, meaning Molly’s ‘narration was 
privileged as more truthful than the stories told by Mr. Rice and Frank’ (Russell, 2013:215). 
Again, the trouble is that this privileging is signified by purely visible means. The non-
normative positivisms of Molly’s characterisation become disrupted by the normative 
positivisms and non-normative negativisms of the dramatic staging and its discourse. 
 
Implicit in the dramatic use of sight and light to signify truth and understanding, the 
metaphorisation that is frequently applied in representations of visual impairment pertains to 
knowledge. Blindness, according to an interview with Stephen Kuusisto, ‘functions most 
often as an ableist metaphor for lack of affect or an inability to understand the world’ 
(Savarese, 2009: 202). In a slip from normative positivisms to non-normative negativisms, 
visual terms are used to make epistemological points and thus invoke the notion that seeing is 
synonymous with knowing, from which it all too easily follows that not seeing is 
synonymous with not knowing (Bolt, 2014b). However, it has been asserted that Molly 
Sweeney does not give ‘credence in its ultimate discourse to casual assimilations between 
seeing and understanding’, for an ‘unsentimental refutation of long-established metaphors of 
light and darkness, ignorance and knowledge’, lies at the heart of the play (Upton, 1997, 347). 
Unsurprisingly, it has also been suggested that sight becomes a metaphor for knowledge, but 
the thing to note here is that the ‘easy equation of sight and insight is troubled by the 
unreliability of perception and memory’, that the sighted characters are ‘the least insightful’ 
(DeVinney, 1999: 111). What is more, the ‘unreliability of sight extends to the audience’, for 
the play admits of a ‘truth beyond the physically realized world that we see onstage’ 
(DeVinney, 1999: 111). In some respects, then, the epistemology explored in Molly Sweeney 
is characterised by non-normative positivisms. 
 
This epistemology informs a reading of key scenes in the play. From the outset the audience 
is informed that when Molly ‘spoke of her disability, there was no self-pity’ and that she ‘had a 
full life and never felt at all deprived’ (Friel, 1994: 5, 6). Molly goes on to assert the pleasure she 
derives from work, radio, walking, music, cycling, and especially swimming:  
 
Just offering yourself to the experience – every pore open and eager for that world 
of pure sensation, of sensation alone – sensation that could not have been enhanced 
by sight – experience that existed only by touch and feel; and moving swiftly and 
rhythmically through that enfolding world; and the sense of such assurance, such 
liberation, such concordance with it . . . Oh I can't tell you the joy swimming gave 
me. I used to think that the other people in the pool with me, the sighted people, that 
in some way their pleasure was actually diminished because they could see, because 
seeing in some way qualified the sensation; and that if they only knew how full, 
how total my pleasure was, I used to tell myself that they must, they really must 
envy me. (Friel, 1994: 15) 
 
In these lines, haptic perception becomes supreme rather than supplementary. More than what 
has been termed a ‘viable possibility for a new way of seeing’ (Upton, 1997: 348), Friel offers 
an ‘imaginative rendering of a marginalized aesthetic’ (Feeney, 2009: 92). Indeed, the 
supremacy of visual perception is challenged recurrently as the audience is furnished with 
Molly’s version of events. On the night before the pivotal operation, for example, there is an 
impromptu party for Molly but, far from being excited at the prospect of visual restoration, 
she nurses major epistemological concerns (Bolt, 2014b). Why should she have to learn a 
new way of knowing? Will she ever again experience community in a profound way? These 
and other such worries about exile and homesickness dramatically challenge the normative 
positivisms and non-normative negativisms of medicalisation. In Molly’s final monologue, 
she ‘comes to be at ease, if not at home, in the vigorous imaginative world of the mind’ 
(Russell, 2013:209). She does not speak of her ‘lack of vision’ as a disability but a means to 
‘create the new fantasy world she hopefully occupies and imbues with movement through her 
mind’ (Russell, 2013: 214-15). That is to say, the apparently unhappy ending can be 
interpreted positively.  
 
If drama is one of the oldest forms of literary representations, one of the newest is the 
disability memoir, which falls under the rubric of life writing and is the most likely to impart 
embodied epistemology. The full importance of this work is recognised, for example, in the 
concept of autistic presence, which resists the discursive simplification of autism (Murray, 
2008). The material nature of this presence, the ‘excess it creates when confronted with any 
idea of what “normal” human activity or behaviour might he, stubbornly refuses to be 
reduced to any narrative — medical, social or cultural — that might seek to contain it without 
reference to its own terms’ (Murray, 2008: xviii), as exemplified in the work of Amanda 
Baggs, among other people. The presence contains its own logic and methods, which have to 
be understood, where possible from within, if a full idea of autism’s place in the world is ever 
to be gained (Murray, 2008). These ‘expressions can be found across a range of cultural 
productions’ (Murray, 2008: 6), one of which is the disability memoir. These new memoirs 
are defined by an awareness of disability as social, cultural, legal, and architectural obstacles, 
but usually involve the formation of a disabled identity (Couser, 2011). For instance, 
published in 2006, Eavesdropping is Stephen Kuusisto’s second memoir about visual 
impairment – his first being the prize-winning Planet of the Blind. With an explicit focus on 
listening that is captured in the book’s form (i.e., audio postcards), Eavesdropping moves 
from memories of a relatively isolated childhood to those of travelling and meeting people as 
a successful, highly sociable adult. 
 
Kuusisto’s Eavesdropping does not seek to contain the experience of visual impairment in 
ocularnormative terms, meaning it illustrates non-normative positivisms in many ways. Most 
explicit in the ‘innovative nature of the audio postcards, variation in sensory perception, such 
as Kuusisto’s, can often imbue a poet’s sensibilities with a more intense awareness of the 
body and provide insight into the interaction between body, text, and environment’ 
(Melancon, 2009: 184). Indeed, encouraged by the Disabled People’s Movement (including 
the Disability Arts Movement), the writings of many of us who identify as disabled 
demonstrate a perspective on life that is both interesting and affirmative, one that can be used 
positively (Swain and French, 2000). Hence, happiness, according to Eavesdropping, can be 
derived from creative listening. Kuusisto remembers being ‘flat out happy, talking about the 
wilderness of noises and the hours in a day’ (Kuusisto, 2006: 49). He recalls the happiness of 
listening to two students from New York University talking about jazz: ‘They had gone to the 
Blue Note to hear Oscar Peterson. They had grown up on Madonna but now they were 
grooving in New York and I was happy to be hearing about it’ (Kuusisto, 2006: 80). 
Furthermore, he writes of raising the ante around the art of listening: ‘I wanted to be a 
listener. And by this I meant I wanted to be a happy man’ (Kuusisto, 2006: 122). These and 
other such examples show how Eavesdropping represents a departure from the dominant 
ocularnormative discourse, for happiness is found by savouring experiences of the world via 
auditory means. 
 
What this memoir also illustrates is the difficulty of departing from the dominance of 
ocularnormative discourse, for non-normative positivisms are sometimes destructively 
framed as non-normative negativisms. For example, according to one of the reviews on the 
back cover, Eavesdropping is ‘about vision, ways of seeing with other senses, principally 
hearing’ (Merwin ctd. in Kuusisto, 2006). Though manifestly supportive, this comment runs 
counter to the content of the book in which Kuusisto states, ‘I cannot see the world by ear, I 
can only reinvent it for my own purposes. But admitting this may make me lucky’ (Kuusisto, 
2006: viii). Indeed, much as Sava’s Helen moves beyond the ocularnormative phase of 
longing to see, Kuusisto asserts from the outset that ‘recognition as a sighted person’ is no 
longer craved (Kuusisto, 2006: vii). To render Eavesdropping a memoir about seeing with 
other senses (or Molly Sweeney a play about a new way of seeing) is ocularcentric, manifestly 
so, but it is also indicative of ocularnormativism, as though all means of perception must be 
framed in visual terms. Without the benefit of embodied epistemology, the non-normative 
positivisms of representation are evidently in danger of being flattened by the discursive 
continuum of normative positivisms and non-normative negativisms.  
 
 
Conclusion: Happiness without cure  
 
This article introduces a tripartite model of disability and illustrates how it can be applied in 
the analysis of literary representations. Consideration is given not only to normative 
positivisms and non-normative negativisms but also to non-normative positivisms, meaning 
that research about literary representations of visual impairment, as in my example, can 
benefit from understandings of fruitful alternatives to the dominance of visual perception, as 
well as awareness of ocularcentric assumptions and ocularnormative discrimination.  
 
Much of the embodied epistemology that informs disability studies (especially work around 
the social model) suggests that the continuum of normative positivisms and non-normative 
negativisms that the tripartite model disrupts is resonant with the medical modelling of 
disability. This medicalisation is underpinned by normative positivisms, a preoccupation with 
which renders paramount the very idea of cure. This being so, if and when the third part of 
the proposed model is illustrated, it seems possible if not probable that the representation will 
depart from the medicalisation of disability, from what Kuusisto calls the idea that people 
who identify as disabled ‘are merely patients waiting in line for their proper cure’ (Savarese, 
2009: 199). In other words, a representation that recognises non-normative positivisms is 
more likely to be appreciative of the fact that, as Kuusisto puts it, ‘no one needs to be cured 
to achieve a life of dignity and purpose’ (Savarese, 2009: 199). The tripartite model, then, 
contains an implied logic in which happiness and disability can coexist without the presence 
or promise of cure. 
 
Despite the various medical aspects of the literary representations considered in this article, 
the implied logic of the tripartite model is illustrated in my reading and sustained elsewhere 
in the three texts. For instance, in Eavesdropping, Kuusisto laments being offered casual 
cures by a number of strangers, including a ‘Catholic Woman of the Year’ in a hotel lobby, 
another woman in a diner, a man who assists people who have impairments around an airport, 
and another man who is a systems analyst for the airline (Kuusisto, 2006: 83-93). These 
encounters chime with Sava’s Happiness is Blind insofar as cure is not sought by Helen from 
the outset – although it does become so when she has a child. Ironically, the curative 
operation is rendered unsuccessful because Helen is so keen to see her child in the sunlight 
that she removes her bandages prematurely: ‘And then came the sudden blackness – an awful 
hot blackness. She almost dropped Victor Anthony to the floor with the pain of it. The sunshine 
was gone’ (Sava, 1987: 189). In this moment Helen’s ocularnormative longing peaks, so she 
comes to appreciate perception in non-visual ways that depart from medical preoccupations 
with cure. Along similar lines, in Friel's Molly Sweeney, the title character sets out with 
appreciation of her nonvisual means of perception but has ocularnormative longings imposed 
on her. It has even been argued that her surname echoes the Irish myth of the exiled Sweeney, 
who is doomed to leap from tree to tree, much as Frank ‘leaps at the chance’ of a cure for 
Molly (Russell, 2013: 210). Thus, although Friel's ‘theatrical technique’ builds on the 
‘structure of Faith Healer, as interwoven monologues recall events from an indefinable location 
in time and space’ (Upton, 1997: 356), the consequence is an unwanted and ultimately 
disastrous cure. That is to say, all three of these literary representations challenge 
preconceptions about disability in their disruption of the notion that cure is a necessary 
preliminary of happiness. After all, the assumption tends to be that, for those of us who 
identify as disabled, medical intervention holds the key to happiness if it is a possibility at all.  
 
This article illustrates the tripartite model of disability with reference to literary 
representations of visual impairment, but only by way of example. For instance, work on 
literary representations of hearing impairment can similarly benefit from awareness of not 
only audiocentrism and hearing loss, but also Deaf Gain. What is more, although I focus on 
literary representation, other work in the Humanities if not the Social Sciences could be 
enhanced by the proposed model. The examples could go on and on, the point being that 
researchers working on disability must be open to the possibility of positive discourse and 
ensure that the full spectrum of aspiration and flourishing is not reduced in accordance with 
limited expectations (Sunderland et al., 2009). The ubiquitous assumptions of suffering in 
representations of disability must be met with and thus disrupted by embodied epistemology 
that acknowledges Otherness and victimisation, but not at the expense of happiness.   
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